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Employers Beware: The Ninth Circuit's Rejection of
the "Direct Threat to Self' Disability Discrimination
Defense in Echazabal v. Chevron
Sheehan Sullivan*
In May of 2000, the Ninth Circuit addressed for the first time
the issue of whether an employer can defend against an employee's
disability discrimination claim by asserting that the employee's dis-
ability poses a direct threat to the employee's own health and safety.
In Echazabal v. Chevron,' the Ninth Circuit analyzed in depth the "di-
rect threat to self' defense, which has been available to employers un-
der the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regula-
tions in apparent conflict with the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)2 provision defining affirmative defenses. The defense was as-
serted by Chevron when Echazabal, a contract employee applying for
a permanent position in an oil refinery plant, sued for disability dis-
crimination. Chevron did not hire Echazabal because he was suffering
from a severe case of hepatitis C. The position he sought required ex-
posure to chemicals, which would almost certainly have worsened his
critical condition, resulting in death. The Ninth Circuit's decision not
to recognize the "direct threat to self' defense has wide-reaching im-
plications for employers and employees alike. This Note will discuss
those implications and analyze the court's rationale and reasoning in
coming to the conclusion.
* J.D. candidate 2002, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., University of Oregon. I would
like to thank the Seattle University Law Review editorial board and staff for all of their tireless
work in editing and shaping this article. I would also like to thank my family, friends, and Dan
who kept me smiling during the entire process.
1. 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 2001 WL 267478 (U.S. Oct., 29, 2001).
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to Echazabal but has yet to decide the issue as of No-
vember 2001.
2. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994)).
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The ADA, which prohibits employers from discriminating
against "qualified individuals with a disability," provides a direct
threat affirmative defense for employers.' Before Echazabal, an em-
ployer charged with disability discrimination could assert the defense
against an employee who presented a direct threat to the health and
safety of the employee himself or herself and others in the workplace.4
The Ninth Circuit's failure to recognize the direct threat defense in
Echazabal improperly eliminates the defense's application in situations
where there is a threat to an individual's health and safety. The court
should have allowed the "direct threat to self' defense because (1) the
EEOC should be given deference in interpreting the ADA provision,
(2) limiting the defense will result in numerous inherent conflicts be-
tween anti-discrimination laws and workplace health and safety laws,
(3) the narrowness of the direct threat test serves to alleviate concerns
of improper paternalistic employment practices, and (4) limiting the
defense will adversely affect employers, imposing undue burdens on
them.
This Note will address whether the Ninth Circuit should have
upheld the "direct threat to self' defense. First, the Note will intro-
duce the "direct threat to self' debate in the context of the ADA's lan-
guage, the EEOC-outlined regulatory provisions, and the case law
surrounding the direct threat question. Specifically, the Note will ad-
dress (1) the relationship between the ADA and the EEOC, (2) the
compatiblity of the ADA with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and (3)
the case law applying the EEOC regulations, the ADA provisions,
and the Rehabilitation Act provisions. Next, the Note will discuss the
factual context of Echazabal, the Ninth Circuit's rationale supporting
its holding that the "direct threat to self' defense is invalid, and the
dissent's argument that such defense should be recognized. Finally,
the Note will discuss the court's flawed reasoning, arguing that the
"direct threat to self' defense is valid and should have been applied in
Echazabal.
I. THE DIRECT THREAT DEBATE
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against
"qualified individuals with a disability" on the basis of that disability.'
"Qualified individual with a disability" is defined as "an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position .... Con-
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a).
4. 29 C.F.R, § 1630.2(r) (2001).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
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sideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what func-
tions of a job are essential."6 The first question a court must address
when assessing the validity of a disability discrimination claim is
whether the disabled individual is able to perform the essential func-
tions of the job.' If an employer fires, or does not hire, an individual
who is able to perform the essential functions of the job, the employer
may assert, in some instances, a direct threat defense. To prevail on a
direct threat defense, the employer must demonstrate that the em-
ployee cannot perform the job functions without a significant direct
threat to the health and safety of the employee or others.8 Herein lies
the debate: should the direct threat defense apply only to a threat to
the health and safety of others, as is stated in the ADA, or should it be
expanded to encompass a threat to the health and safety of the em-
ployee as promulgated by the EEOC? The final inquiry for determin-
ing if the employer has wrongfully discriminated on the basis of dis-
ability is whether, given the direct threat the employee may present,
the employer can make a reasonable accommodation that would en-
able the employee to perform the essential functions of the job without
undue hardship on the employer.'
A. Relationship Between the ADA and the EEOC
The crux of this debate grows out of the apparent conflict be-
tween provisions of the ADA and the regulations promulgated by the
EEOC. As the administrative agency implementing the ADA, the
EEOC draws its administrative powers from the Act itself.'" The
ADA provides that the Act must be implemented so as not to dupli-
cate the efforts of, or create standards inconsistent with, the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973, and the EEOC is charged with carrying out this
task." Thus, the EEOC must implement the Act's provisions consis-
tent with the Rehabilitation Act.
6. Id.
7. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); See also Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247
(9th Cir. 1999); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985).
8. The "defense" section of the ADA states that the term "qualification standards" may
include a requirement that the individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health and safety of
other individuals in the workplace. 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (a) (1994).
9. The relevant portion of the ADA states that discrimination includes:
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or an em-
ployee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(5)(a) (1994).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12117 (1994).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b).
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The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was enacted to prohibit disability
discrimination. 12 Its purpose was to "empower individuals with dis-
abilities to maximize employment, economic self-sufficiency, inde-
pendence, and inclusion and integration into society... [and] ensure
that the Federal Government plays a leadership role in promoting the
employment of individuals with disabilities."'" The Act did not ex-
pressly address an affirmative defense by government agencies when
the potential disabled employee poses a direct threat to the health and
safety of the individual and others. However, the regulations enacted
under the Rehabilitation Act explicitly addressed the issue in defining
a "qualified handicapped person" as someone who can work in a posi-
tion without endangering the health and safety of the individual or
others. 4 This definition clearly makes an allowance for an employer
to choose not to hire potential employees if, because of their disability,
they pose a direct threat to the health and safety of themselves.
While both the ADA and the EEOC allow an affirmative de-
fense to an employer who chooses not to hire a potential employee on
the basis that the employee poses a direct threat to the health and
safety of others,"5 only the EEOC clearly extends the defense to situa-
tions where the employee poses a direct threat to the health and safety
of himself or herself. The EEOC regulations allow an employer to
adopt a set of qualifications including that the employee not pose a di-
rect threat to the health and safety of the individual or others in the
workplace.' 6 At first blush, this seems at odds with the ADA provi-
sion extending the direct threat defense only to others in the work-
place. But, an in-depth look at the Act, the Act's purpose, the case
law applying the standard, and the EEOC's role will clarify this dis-
crepancy and demonstrate that the EEOC is correct in including the
individual within the scope of the defense.
B. Case Law Addressing Direct Threat Defense
The tension between the ADA and the EEOC has received only
minimal consideration in most circuit courts. Those circuits that have
addressed the "direct threat to self' defense have generally accepted it
as a valid defense to a disability discrimination claim. However, gen-
eral acceptance of the "direct threat to self' defense does not present a
clear rule as to whether it is a legitimate defense under the ADA.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 701(b).
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.703 (2001).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15 (b)(2) (2001).
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001).
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1. Circuits Accepting the "Direct Threat to Self' Defense
The First, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have upheld the "direct
threat to self' defense, although none of these circuits have analyzed
the defense in depth. The Eleventh Circuit held that the allowable de-
fenses to disability discrimination did include a "direct threat to self'
defense in Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc.,17 a case involving an
epileptic man who was terminated from his job because he worked
above and below fast moving press rollers and conveyor belts. In
reaching its conclusion permitting such a defense, the court relied al-
most exclusively on the EEOC regulations; consequently, there was
no analysis as to whether the defense promulgated by the EEOC was
valid under the ADA.18 In a similar case, the Eleventh Circuit ad-
dressed the "direct threat to self' defense in dicta. In La Chance v.
Duffy's Draft House19 an employee's epilepsy caused him to be a direct
threat to the health and safety of himself and others while he worked
as a line cook, and, thus, he was not a "qualified individual with a dis-
ability" under the ADA.2" During the first two days of work, the em-
ployee had three seizures.21 The court emphasized that the employee
posed a threat both to himself and to others because of the appliances
he worked around, which included hot ovens, fryers with boiling
grease, and slicers.22 The La Chance case can be reconciled with the
ADA provision applying to the direct threat to others as well as with
the EEOC regulation applying to the direct threat to others or self.
The First Circuit addressed the question of "direct threat to self'
in EEOC v. Amego." The court held that an employee working at a
home for the severely disabled was unqualified because she could not
perform the essential functions of the job and that reasonable accom-
modations would cause an undue burden on the employer.24 The em-
ployee was severely depressed and attempted suicide twice.2" The
court found that, because of her disability, the employee was unable to
perform the essential functions of the job, which entailed administer-
ing and monitoring resident medications.26 The court found it inap-
propriate to engage in the "direct threat to self' defense analysis be-
17. Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 1996).
18. Id. at 447.
19. 146 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 1996).
20. Id. at 836. LaChance did not prevail in his suit in part due to his lack of probative evi-
dence that Duffy's Draft House could have made his workplace safe. See id.
21. Id. at 833.
22. Id. at 835.
23. 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997).
24. Id. at 144-49.
25. Id. at 138.
26. Id. at 144-47.
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cause the employee, by failing to safely administer medications to the
patients, necessarily posed a risk to others. 27 However, the court rec-
ognized that Congress intended the ADA's definition of "qualified in-
dividual with a disability" to be comparable to the definition used in
regulations implementing Sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.2" The regulations under the Rehabilitation Act define a
qualified individual with a handicap as someone who does not endan-
ger the health and safety of the individual or others.29 Thus, the First
Circuit clearly vocalized acceptance of the "direct threat to self' de-
fense.
Along similar lines, the Fifth Circuit recognized the validity of
the "direct threat to self' defense in Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.,3"
a case where an employee with diabetes worked as a chemical process
operator and was found to have posed a threat to the health and safety
of others when he made dangerous mistakes due to his diabetic condi-
tion." The employee became unfocused when his blood sugar
dropped below certain levels. The court held that the employee failed
to show that he was a "qualified individual with a disability" under
the ADA because he could not perform the essential functions of the
job, including walking, climbing, and concentrating on his work. 2 In
dicta, the court indicated that even if the employee had been a "quali-
fied individual with a disability" under the ADA, his employer could
still have fired him since he posed a safety risk both to himself and to
others.33 The court editorialized that the employee was "a walking
time bomb and woe unto the employer who places an employee in that
[chemical process operator] position. ,34
27. Id. at 144.
28. Id. (citing H.R. REP. 101-485, pt.2, at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
337).
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(6) (2001)).
30. 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996).
31. Id. at 1090.
32. Id. at 1093-94; see also Wann v. American Airlines, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 82 (S.D. Tex.
1994). In Wann, the court held that applicant, who suffered from serious breathing problems,
was unable to perform the essential functions of the job, and the airline could not provide a rea-
sonable accommodation without eliminating most of the job's essential functions. Id. at 85. The
applicant suffered from a breathing problem that would worsen and be agitated by working as a
fleet service clerk because of the necessary exposure to dust and fumes. Id. at 83-84. The court
stated that the "qualified individual with a disability" also included a personal safety require-
ment. Id. at 85. While the court did not discuss direct threat to self it asserts a clear position
that if an applicant's personal safety would be seriously jeopardized, the applicant might not be a
"qualified individual with a disability." Id.
33. Id. at 1094.
34. Id.
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2. Courts Not Accepting "Direct Threat to Self' Defense
At least one district court has addressed the "direct threat to self'
defense and the discrepancy between the ADA and the EEOC regula-
tions. In Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,3S the Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois held that any jury instruction on
the direct threat defense must refer to a direct threat to other individu-
als, not to the disabled person himself.36 There, the employer raised a
defense that qualification standards, including the requirement that an
individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace, are job-related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity and that such performance cannot be accomplished by
reasonable accommodation. The court reasoned that the EEOC regu-
lation interpreting the ADA direct threat provision to include threat to
self would render meaningless certain words in the ADA.37 Specifi-
cally, the ADA refers to "a direct threat to the health and safety of
other individuals in the workplace, '38 and an adoption of the EEOC
regulation would defeat the words "other individuals in the work-
place."39 Kohnke serves as the only clear articulation of the ADA/
EEOC discrepancy prior to Echazabal.
3. The "Direct Threat to Self' Defense as Interpreted under the
Rehabilitation Act
Along with the scant "direct threat to self' precedent in the cir-
cuit courts, the case law on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 also de-
serves attention as valid precedent. Prior to the ADA, the Rehabilita-
tion Act answered the question of whether an employer could choose
not to hire an individual posing a direct threat to his or her own health
and safety. As such, the Rehabilitation Act decisions serve as guide-
lines for the EEOC's implementation of the ADA since Congress ex-
plicitly intended the ADA to be consistent with the Rehabilitation
Act.4" As previously mentioned, a regulation promulgated under the
Rehabilitation Act defines a "qualified individual with a handicap" as
a person who does not endanger the health and safety of the individual
35. 932 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. I11. 1996). There is very little reference to the facts of this
case in the district court opinion. There is one other case that recognizes the discrepancy between
the ADA provision and the EEOC regulations, but it is unpublished and lacks any substantive
analysis of the direct threat issue. See Devlin v, Arizona Youth Soccer Ass'n, No. CIV 95-745
TUC ACM, 1996 WL 118445 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8,1996).
36. Kohnke, 932 F. Supp. at 1110.
37. Id. at 1111.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994).
39. Kohnke, 932 F. Supp. at 1112.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (1994).
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or others in the workplace.41 Two Ninth Circuit cases, Mantolete v.
Bolger 2 and Bentivega v. United States Department of Labor,43 address
the issue of whether an employer's choice not to hire an employee
whose disability poses a threat to the employee's own health and safety
was a legitimate defense under the Rehabilitation Act.
In Mantolete v. Bolger, the court held that a disabled employee
was not a qualified handicapped person if her employment would pose
a reasonable probability of substantial harm to her.44 The applicant,
who was epileptic, had applied to work at the post office as a "Multi-
purpose Letter Sorter Machine" operator. 45  During the pre-
employment physical examination, the doctor recommended that the
applicant be placed in a position that did not involve using machinery
with moving parts.46 Based on this medical report, the post office de-
clined to consider the applicant for the letter sorting machine operator
position.47 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on both the lan-
guage of the regulations and the Congressional intent behind the Re-
habilitation Act.48 The court also articulated the proper standard for
review: the test is "whether, in light of the individual's work history
and medical history, employment of that individual would pose a rea-
sonable probability of substantial harm."49 Under this rule, the em-
ployer must (1) gather all relevant information about the applicant's
work and medical history and (2) independently assess both the prob-
ability and severity of potential harm to the applicant or to others in
the workplace."°
In Bentivega v. United States Dept. of Labor, the Ninth Circuit,
reviewing the decision of Secretary of Labor declining to award back-
pay, held that Labor Secretary applied too lenient a standard in find-
ing that because the individual's employment would cause an "ele-
vated risk of injury," he was not a qualified handicapped person.5' In
that case, the employee, who was diabetic, was hired as a "building re-
pairer. 512 The employer required diabetic employees to demonstrate
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.703 (2001).
42. 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
43. 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982).
44. Mantolete, 767 F.2d at 1422.
45. Id. at 1418.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1421-22.
49. Id. at 1422.
50. Id. at 1423.
51. 694 F.2d at 622-23.
52. Id. at 620.
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"control" of their blood sugar levels.5 3 After a routine test, the em-
ployee's blood sugar level indicated that there was a significant possi-
bility of lack of control, and he was fired.5 4 The issue was whether the
employment qualification that the employee have a certain blood sugar
level was "directly connected with, and substantially promote[d] busi-
ness necessity and safe performance."" The employer claimed that
this standard was employed to avoid risk of future injury and long-
term health problems.5 6 In concluding that this "elevated risk of in-
jury" was insufficient to disqualify a handicapped person, the Ninth
Circuit questioned the standard applied, but not the right of the em-
ployer to include in the job qualifications that the employee does not
pose a risk to either himself or to others.5 7
In light of the case law addressing the "direct threat to self' de-
fense, it is clear that there is no bright line rule for determining
whether "direct threat to self' should or should not be applied. In this
context, the discussion will now turn to Echazabal v. Chevron.
II. ECHAZABAL V. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC.
Echazabal began working in Chevron's oil refinery in 1972 as a
contract employee, and his employment continued until 1996.8 He
had been working at the oil refinery for twenty years as a contract em-
ployee when he decided to apply for a position with Chevron working
in the same coker unit location. 9 In 1992, he was extended a job offer
that was contingent on a physical examination.60 Echazabal accepted
the offer and submitted to a pre-employment medical examination;
unfortunately, the examination uncovered that he had contracted
hepatitis C, which resulted in a serious liver problem.61 Based on the
results of the examination, Chevron rescinded the job offer after it de-
termined that the job's necessary exposure to various solvents and
chemicals would put Echazabal at risk of further damage to his liver.
6 2
Despite his diagnosis with hepatitis C, Echazabal continued working
in the coker unit through his employment with the maintenance con-
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 622-23.
56. Id. at 623.
57. Id.
58. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted,
2001 WL 267478 (U.S. Oct., 29, 2001).
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tractor. 6" Ironically, his continuing work with the contractor was the
very same work with the very same exposure to the very same danger-
ous chemicals as the job he was applying for with Chevron.64
In 1995, Echazabal again applied to Chevron for the same posi-
tion in the coker unit.65 As before, Chevron offered him the job con-
tingent on passing the physical examination.66 The examination re-
sults were the same, and Chevron again rescinded its offer based on its
concern that Echazabal would be at risk of further liver damage.67
However, this time, in addition to rescinding its job offer, Chevron
took further steps to remove Echazabal from the coker unit alto-
gether.68 Chevron requested the maintenance contractor employing
Echazabal to immediately remove him from the coker unit and place
him in a position that would eliminate his exposure to solvents and
chemicals that would likely worsen his liver condition.69 Shortly there-
after, the contractor took action; instead of reassigning Echazabal to a
safer location, it terminated his employment altogether.
Echazabal filed several complaints with the EEOC and sued
Chevron in state court for disability discrimination under the ADA.7"
The case was removed to federal court, and the district court granted
Chevron's motion for summary judgment.7 Echazabal appealed, and
the case went before the Ninth Circuit.72 The Ninth Circuit held (1)
that any direct threat posed by Echazabal to his own health and safety
did not provide Chevron with an affirmative defense to its ADA
liability for refusing to hire him and (2) that any risk that Echazabal's
liver would be damaged from further exposure to solvents and chemi-
cals that were present in the refinery did not preclude him from being
"otherwise qualified" within the meaning of the ADA.73
A. The Ninth Circuit's Rationale
The court supported its holding with (1) the plain language of
the ADA, (2) the Act's legislative history, (3) the Act's purpose and
policy, and with (4) case law prohibiting paternalistic employment











73. Id. at 1067.
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pretation of the ADA, holding that the EEOC regulation providing
for the "direct threat to self' defense goes against the clear intent of
the ADA direct threat provision.
The court relied most heavily on the language of the ADA to
justify its limitation of the scope of the defense. Specifically, the direct
threat defense provision states that employers can impose a require-
ment that "an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health
and safety of other individuals in the workplace."74 The fact that the
provision does not explicitly include reference to the individual's own
health and safety, the court concluded, is a clear indication that the di-
rect threat defense was limited to others.7 Furthermore, the definition
section of Title I of the ADA defines a direct threat as one that poses a
"significant risk to the health and safety of others that cannot be
eliminated by reasonable accommodation. '"76 This exclusion of any
reference to the individual is consistent throughout the statutory pro-
visions." For the forgoing reasons, the court concluded that the plain
language of the provision does not include a direct threat to the indi-
vidual.
The court then turned to the legislative history of the ADA to
further support its conclusion that the direct threat defense does not
apply to threat to self. Interwoven throughout the ADA committee
reports and hearings are references to the direct threat defense.7" At
no point are these references to the defense ever accompanied by a ref-
erence to the health and safety of the individual.7" Additionally, ac-
cording to at least two reports, the direct threat defense is intended to
be a codification of the Supreme Court decision, School Board of Nas-
sau County v. Arline,8 0 which defines direct threat as a "significant risk
to the health and safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reason-
able accommodation. '"8" While the Ninth Circuit recognized that the
House Committee on Education and Labor clearly stated that a poten-
tial employee may be denied employment based on a high probability
of substantial harm to his own health, the court dismissed the state-







80. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
81. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 34, 45-46 (1990) (citing Arline), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
457), cert. granted, 2001 WL 267478 (U.S. Oct., 29, 2001).
82. Id.
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on the absence of any mention of the individual in the legislative his-
tory to support its contention that threats to one's own health or safety
should be excluded from the scope of the direct threat defense.8"
Another line of reasoning offered in support of the court's limita-
tion on the scope of the direct threat defense involves the purpose and
policy behind the ADA. The Act was designed to prohibit paternalis-
tic discrimination against individuals with disabilities.84 The funda-
mental purpose behind limiting paternalism is to deter employers
from making "overprotective rules and policies" affecting individuals
with disabilities.85
The court also discussed the Supreme Court cases that have held
that paternalistic employment policies relating to other areas of em-
ployment discrimination are prohibited by various statutes. Specifi-
cally, the court cited Dothard v. Rawlinson86 and International Union,
United Automobile Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 87 both of which deal with gender dis-
crimination. In Dothard, the Court said in dicta that an employer
normally cannot refuse to hire a woman for a dangerous job since Title
VII allows a woman to choose for herself whether to accept a job even
if the job is very dangerous. 88 However, the Court allowed the em-
ployer to restrict its hiring policy to only men because, in a maximum-
security male penitentiary, "sex was a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation. '89 The Court reasoned that, in such a situation, there was
more to be weighed than the individual woman's decision to accept the
risks of the employment; more importantly, the employment of the
female guard could create a "real threat to the safety of others if vio-
lence broke out." 90
In Johnson Controls, the Court again emphasized, "danger to the
woman herself does not justify discrimination."'" Here, the danger
was that the female employee would be exposed to lead if allowed to
work at the battery manufacturing plant.92 Exposure to lead, a key
element used in batteries, is harmful to the female reproductive sys-
tem, especially to an unborn fetus.93 The Ninth Circuit in Echazabal
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1068.
85. Id.
86. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
87. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
88. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 336.
91. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202.
92. Id. at 206-207.
93. Id.
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related these Supreme Court decisions to the disability discrimination
in a similar context where the individual's choice to accept the risks of
the job, regardless of the effects on the health and safety of the indi-
vidual, is limited by the employer's policy of not employing those
whose health and safety would be at risk because of their employ-
ment. 4
Finally, the Echazabal court addressed whether it should defer to
the EEOC's interpretation and implementation of the ADA, or
whether it should scrutinize the Act to determine if a "direct threat to
self' defense is allowed. The court chose the latter as the proper
course of action."5 In addressing this question, the court looked to the
Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,96 which laid out the test for determining if a court
should defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute
rather than the court making that determination itself.9" The test,
which will be discussed at length in Section III(A) of this Note, re-
quires the court to defer to the administrative agency if there is any
ambiguity or lack of clarity in congressional intent regarding the mat-
ter at hand.98 If congressional intent is clear, then the court and the
administrative agency must give effect to that intent.99 In such a case,
the court does not owe deference to the administrative agency's inter-
pretation of the Act.1"0
In determining that Congress clearly intended not to include a
"direct threat to self' defense, the court looked to the legislative his-
tory of the ADA. While acknowledging that the legislative history
does include statements that could be read as allowing a "direct threat
to self' defense for employers, the court nonetheless finds that the in-
tent of Congress was not to include a "direct threat to self' defense be-
cause of the numerous other instances where the application to the in-
dividual is not included. 1
The court also addressed the argument put forth by Chevron
that excluding the "direct threat to self' defense from application to
threat to self would be exposing employers to substantial tort liabil-
ity.0 2 This point was raised and dismissed with little discussion; the
94. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1068.
95. Id. at 1069.
96. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
97. Id. at 842-43.




102. Id. at 1070.
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court merely stated that the federal anti-discrimination law would pre-
empt state tort law.
10 3
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Trott, in dissent, argued that the court should have al-
lowed Chevron to choose not to hire Echazabal for the following rea-
sons: (1) Echazabal was not "otherwise qualified" for the job because
performing the essential functions of the job would end up killing him;
(2) not recognizing the "direct threat to self' defense creates an inher-
ent conflict with other laws and regulations relating to employment
discrimination and workplace safety; (3) the court should defer to the
EEOC's interpretation of the Act because the EEOC is in a better po-
sition to decide these matters; (4) Congress could not have intended
such patently absurd results as follow from the majority's reasoning;
and (5) forcing Chevron to hire Echazabal would place an undue bur-
den on Chevron in light of the potential legal peril and the moral bur-
den that would result as Echazabal's condition inevitably worsens,
eventually resulting in death."0 4
Judge Trott argued that Echazabal is not "otherwise qualified" to
work in the coker unit for the simple reason that performing the essen-
tial functions of the job would likely kill him and to ignore such an in-
evitable result would be "bizarre."'0 5 Furthermore, there are numer-
ous statutes and regulations requiring the employer to provide a safe
and healthy workplace. Judge Trott stated:
Long ago we rejected the idea that workers toil at their own peril
in the workplace. "Paternalism" here is just an abstract out-of-
place label of no analytical help.... [T]he concept is pernicious
when it is allowed to dislodge longstanding laws mandating
workplace safety .... In many jurisdictions, it is a crime ... to
[knowingly] subject workers to life endangering conditions.'06
There are three specific examples of this inherent conflict created
by not allowing the "direct threat to self' defense. They are (1) the
California Labor Code that "expressly forbids an employer from put-
ting an employee in harms way,"'0 7 (2) an Arizona law that creates
criminal felony liability for employers that fail to provide a safe work-
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1073-75 (Trott, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1073-74 (Trott, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1074 (Trott, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (citing ANN. CAL. LABOR CODE § 6402).
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place,' and (3) the Occupational Safety and Heath Act (OSHA),
which was enacted to "assure so far as possible every working man and
woman... safe and healthful working conditions."'0 9 In essence, not
allowing an employer to assert a "direct threat to self' defense nullifies
these laws as they apply to the particular employee."0
The dissenting judge offered other justifications for the recogni-
tion of the "direct threat to self' defense. One of them is that the
court has a responsibility to defer to the EEOC's interpretation of the
Act."' This responsibility is attributed to the EEOC's superior
knowledge about disability in the workplace and the threat to health
and safety that such disability might create." 2 Additionally, to hold
that "direct threat to self' is not a legitimate affirmative defense will
lead to absurd results, such as "a steelworker who develops vertigo can
keep his job constructing high rise buildings ... or a person who is al-
lergic to bees is entitled to be hired as a bee keeper."' " This absurdity
cannot have been Congress's intent in enacting the ADA." 4
Furthermore, Judge Trott argued that even if the "direct threat
to self' defense is not available to Chevron, refusing to allow the em-
ployer to make a choice not to hire Echazabal would result in an undue
hardship for Chevron."' This is an alternative affirmative defense
available when an employer can show that an accommodation for the
disabled individual will result in an undue hardship." 6  Hardship
would result because the employer would knowingly subject workers
to life threatening situations opening the door for legal peril and an
unconscionable moral burden."'
III. THE "DIRECT THREAT TO SELF" DEFENSE AND THE COURT'S
FLAWED REASONING
The Echazabal majority erred in holding that the "direct threat
to self' defense was not warranted or intended under the ADA and
that the EEOC's extension of such defense to the individual was, thus,
an inappropriate extension of scope. The court erroneously limited
the direct threat defense to a threat to the health and safety of others.
108. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting) (citing ARIZ. REV. STATS. ANNOT., LABOR §§ 24-403, -
418).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1994).






116. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
117. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1074 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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Such limitation is incorrect because (1) the court should have deferred
to the EEOC's interpretation and implementation of the ADA, (2) the
limitation will result in numerous inherent conflicts between anti-
discrimination laws and workplace health and safety laws, (3) the nar-
rowness of the direct threat test is sufficient to safeguard against pa-
ternalistic policies usurping the Act's intent to allow the employee to
make his or her own choice whenever possible, and because (4) the
implications to the employer in terms of liability and moral burden are
too adverse to support a limitation of the direct threat defense.
A. Agency Deference
The court should have deferred to the EEOC's interpretation of
the ADA in accordance with the test for administrative agency defer-
ence laid out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council."8 In Chevron, the Supreme Court articulated the test to de-
termine whether to defer to an administrative agency's interpretation
of a federal statute or whether to interpret the statute directly when
deciding a point of law." 9 Under Chevron, the court must first look to
whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise question at is-
sue. 2 If Congress has spoken on the precise question, both the court
and the agency must defer to Congress.'2 ' If Congress has not spoken
on the precise issue or has been ambiguous in articulating a position,
then the court must defer to the agency's position so long as it is rea-
sonable.122 In Chevron, the Supreme Court established broad judicial
deference to administrative agencies that Congress has given the
power to carry out the implementation of various federal acts. 123
In applying the Chevron test to Echazabal, the first question to
address is whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise ques-
tion at issue. This can be found in either the statute itself or its legis-
lative history. In Echazabal, the direct threat defense is explicitly in-
cluded in the text of the ADA. 24 An employer is allowed to require
that an "individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health and
safety of other individuals in the workplace,"' 12' and if the employer is
faced with a disability discrimination charge, the employer may assert
118. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).




123. Id. at 844.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994).
125. Id.
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the health requirement as an affirmative defense.1 26  However, the
Chevron analysis does not stop here because the ADA does not speak
directly to the issue of whether an employer can assert the "direct
threat to self' defense. The legislative history, however, provides in-
sight into whether Congress intended to provide a defense to employ-
ers when the potential employee poses a threat to the employee's own
health and safety.
The direct threat defense was discussed in Congress throughout
the ADA enactment process. Admittedly, none of the discussions in-
clude the phrase "direct threat to the individual"; references to direct
threat are usually made in the context of an employee who is a direct
threat to the health and safety of others.'27 However, the Senate Re-
port even includes a reference to the direct threat to property, which
could be construed as an affirmative defense.'28 The House Judiciary
Report, similar to the Senate Report, references the direct threat de-
fense as applying to others. 129  This pattern is consistent throughout
the ADA with one glaring exception found in the House Labor Com-
mittee Report.
30
The House Labor Committee Report expressly addresses the is-
sue of what an employer can do in the event the potential employee
poses a risk of harm to himself/herself in the workplace. 131 While dis-
cussing this issue in the context of the permissibility of conditional job
offers pending a pre-employment medical examination, the House
Committee states:
126. The statute reads, in part:
[I]t may be a defense to a charge of discrimination... that an alleged application of
qualification standards ... that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a
job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by
reasonable accommodation.
42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (providing that "qualification standards"
may include that the employee not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals
in the workplace).
127. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 27 ("It is ... acceptable to deny employment to an appli-
cant or to fire an employee with a disability on the basis that the individual poses a direct threat
to the health and safety of others or poses a direct threat to property."); see also id. at 47 ("[T]he
term 'qualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual with a currently con-
tagious disease or infection shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individu-
als in the workplace.").
128. Id. at 27.
129. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt.3, at 45-46 (1990) (stating that the qualification standard
may "include a requirement that an individual not pose a direct threat to the health and safety of
other individuals in the workplace" and that the direct threat defense is a codification of the Su-
preme Court decision in School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 645 N.Y.S.2d 520 (App. Div.
1996)).
130. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 73.
131. Id.
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A candidate, undergoing a post-offer, pre-employment medical
examination may not be excluded, for example, solely on the ba-
sis of an abnormality on the x-ray. However, if the examining
physician found that there was high probability of substantial
harm if the candidate performed the particular functions of the
job in question, the employer could reject the candidate, unless
the employer could make a reasonable accommodation to the
candidate's condition that would avert such harm and such ac-
commodation would not cause undue hardship.'32
The "high probability of substantial harm" standard is based on
the following three factors: (1) there must be a high probability of sub-
stantial harm that is "strictly based on medical analysis,"' 33 (2) the ex-
amining physician's conclusions can be challenged by evidence from
the potential employee's physician,'34 and (3) the decisions must not
be based on "paternalistic views" about what is best for the employee
with the disability.'35 An employer may use a physical or mental crite-
rion to disqualify the disabled person, but the employee may do so
only if the disability has a "direct impact on the ability of the person to
do [his or her] actual job duties" and there is "an imminent, substan-
tial threat of harm.'
136
Furthermore, Congress intended the ADA to be an addition to,
not a replacement for, existing prohibitions on discrimination against
handicapped individuals. 37 The ADA should not be interpreted as
narrowing the scope of the Rehabilitation Act. 3  The Rehabilitation
Act, the regulations promulgated under the ADA, 139 and the case law
dealing with the Rehabilitation Act 4 ° all support the "direct threat to
self' defense. The previously discussed cases strongly indicate accep-
tance of a "direct threat to self' defense. Most notably, the Ninth
Circuit in Mantolete held that a woman with epilepsy was not a quali-
fied handicapped person under the Rehabilitation Act regulations be-
cause her employment as a machine operator would pose a reasonable




135. Id. at 74.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 55.
138. Id.
139. 29 C.F.R. § 1632.2(r) (2001).
140. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); Bentivega v. United States
Dep't. of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982).
141. Mantolete, 767 F.2d at 1424.
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The Ninth Circuit's limitation on the direct threat defense con-
flicts with the Rehabilitation Act and its regulations, which define a
"qualified handicapped individual" as someone who can work in a po-
sition "without endangering the health and safety of the individual or
others."'12 While it is not expressly stated in the ADA or in its legis-
lative history, Congress could not have intended to create a conflict by
containing a directive in the ADA that would be inconsistent with the
requirements of the Rehabilitation Act.'43 The Rehabilitation Act al-
lows employers to have the choice of not hiring someone who is a
threat to the health and safety of themselves. The Ninth Circuit
should have deferred to the ADA's requirement for consistent imple-
mentation of the two Acts when deciding the fate of the "direct threat
to self' defense.
While Congress did not include the word "self' in the text of the
defense section of the ADA, its exclusion is not a clear articulation
against the "direct threat to self' defense. Congress's intent for the
ADA to be read consistently with the Rehabilitation Act and the
House Labor Committee Report's allowance for a quasi "direct threat
to self' defense support this argument. These considerations render
Congress's intent with respect to the "direct threat to self' defense in-
conclusive, which lends support to the EEOC's interpretation of the
ADA. While the House Labor Committee Report was not raised in
the context of the direct threat affirmative defense, it goes directly to
the issue of whether an employer declined to hire an employee because
of a substantial threat to the health and safety of the individual. Con-
gress's attention to the precise question is, at best, ambiguous. Under
the Chevron standard, if Congress's treatment of an issue is ambigu-
ous, the court is obligated to defer to the agency's interpretation of the
statute.144 Consequently, the Echazabal court erred in not paying def-
erence to the EEOC's interpretation.
145
142. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.703 (2001).
143. "The agency with enforcement authority for actions which allege employment dis-
crimination under this subchapter, and under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... shall develop
procedures to ensure that complaints ... are dealt with in a manner ... that prevents imposition
of inconsistent or conflicting standards." 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (1994).
144. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
145. For a comprehensive analysis of Echazabal's implications on workman's compensation
and workplace health and safety laws, see the following article: Katelyn S. Oldham, The Implica-
tions of Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. for Employers and for the Adminstration of Worker's
Compensation and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 80 OR. L. REV. 327 (2001).
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B. Inherent Conflict with Other Workplace and Safety Laws
The limitation imposed by the Echazabal court will also result in
numerous inherent conflicts between anti-discrimination laws and
workplace health and safety laws. The court's narrow interpretation
of the defense opens the door to wildly inconsistent results and stan-
dards when viewed in conjunction with OSHA.'46 While the ADA
and OSHA are different statutes applying to wholly different scenarios
in the workplace, they are the two most prominent statutes regulating
the relationship between employers and employees, and as such, must
be read in light of each other in order for either statute to be effective.
The purpose of OSHA is "to assure so far as possible every working
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working condi-
tions." '147 The Act requires, among other things, employers to "fur-
nish to each of [its] employees employment and a place of employ-
ment which [is] free from recognized hazards that are causing, or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to [its] employees.
' 148
Whether the hazards implicit in allowing Echazabal to work in
the presence of the particular chemicals with his liver condition were
likely to cause death or serious physical harm is not in dispute. If
Echazabal were to work in the coker unit, his liver condition would
almost invariably deteriorate to the point of death or serious illness. 149
At least five separate doctors, including doctors hired not only by
Chevron but also Echazabal's personal physician, strongly recom-
mended that Echazabal not work near the dangerous chemicals be-
cause of the extremely adverse effects on his liver condition.' ° If
Chevron were to hire Echazabal, it would be putting him in an unsafe
and unhealthy work environment. While forcing Chevron to hire
Echazabal will most likely avoid paternalism, it violates the very es-
sence and purpose of OSHA.
Under OSHA, Chevron has a general duty to exercise a degree of
care to ensure that the workplace is safe and healthy for the em-
ployee."' This requires Chevron to prevent recognized hazards to
146. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994). One commentator makes a similar argument focusing primar-
ily on the conflict between the Ninth Circuit's holding in Echazabal and various state workplace
health and safety laws. See Deborah Leigh Bender, Echazabal v. Chevron: A Direct Threat to
Employers in the Ninth Circuit, 76 WASH. L. REV. 859 (2001) (addressing state workplace health
and safety laws, but also addressing the potential inherent conflicts between OSHA and the
Ninth Circuit's narrowing of the direct threat defense).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1994).
149. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted,
2001 WL 267478 (U.S. Oct., 29, 2001).
150. Id.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a).
[Vol. 25:517
"Direct Threat to Self" Defense
employees. 52 The chemical exposure greatly increasing Echazabal's
risk of liver failure is unquestionably a specifically recognized hazard
for Echazabal. Arguably, Chevron cannot prevent the possible death
and serious bodily harm that Echazabal will inevitably suffer. Under
the Ninth Circuit's narrow decision, Chevron is now forced to hire
Echazabal, thus aggravating his liver condition and likely expediting
his death. This conflict between OSHA and the Ninth Circuit's nar-
row direct threat defense is inherently confusing and will frustrate
many employers who try to abide by each standard.
Similarly, the California Labor Code explicitly outlaws any em-
ployer that "require[s], or permit[s] any employee to go or be in any
employment or place of employment which is not safe and health-
ful."'5 3 Chevron cannot comply with this law if required to hire indi-
viduals whose disability poses a substantial risk to the health and
safety of themselves. This conflict is even more apparent when the
employee's disability is worsened by the conditions of the job and
cannot be prevented by reasonable accommodations. The Ninth Cir-
cuit should not have ignored these blatant and disturbing conflicts.
C. Narrowness of the Direct Threat Test
The Echazabal court also erred in ignoring the narrowness of the
direct threat test, which is sufficient in itself to ensure that paternalis-
tic policies will not usurp Congress's intent to allow the employee to
make his or her own choice. The EEOC regulations provide that the
direct threat test shall include a weighing of four factors to determine
whether a significant risk of substantial harm exists.5 4 The four fac-
tors are (1) the duration of the risk, (2) the nature and severity of the
potential harm, (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur,
and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.SS This assessment must
be based on an "an individualized assessment of the individual's pre-
sent ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job"1 6 and
on current medical knowledge and/or the "best available objective
evidence."'5 7 The accompanying notes to this regulation state that the
direct threat defense cannot be permitted when there is merely a slight
increased risk; the defense is only considered when there is a threat of
significant risk.5 8 This requirement is further supported in the legis-
152. Id.
153. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1074 (citing ANN. CAL. LABOR CODE § 6402).




158. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (2001).
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lative history.159 Addressing the "direct threat to self' test specifically
and relying on the legislative history, the appendix to the EEOC regu-
lations states that any assessment must not be based on "stereotypic or
patronizing assumptions. '"160
Furthermore, the EEOC regulations cite to the two key Ninth
Circuit cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act: Mantolete and
Bentivegna discussed previously.'61 The requirement of imminence
and a high probability of substantial harm under the direct threat test
undermines the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the "direct threat to
self' defense allows a forum for employer's paternalistic fears. This
test requires the employer to rigorously assess its employee's ability to
perform before determining that the employee is a direct threat to
himself or herself.'62 Paternalism and a refusal to hire based on any-
thing less than a significant risk of harm is simply not permitted under
the EEOC regulations.
Ignoring the narrow direct threat test's inherent protections
against undue paternalism, the Echazabal court cited Johnson Controls,
a case holding that the danger of lead exposure to a woman's repro-
ductive system did not justify discrimination. However, Johnson Con-
trols and all other cases dealing with the "direct threat to self' question
involve a situation that is strikingly different than that in Echazabal.
First, in any direct threat case, the employer is obligated to make a
rigorous individualized assessment based on objective criteria.'63 John-
son Controls pertains to the exclusion of an entire gender from a certain
type of job, not an individual based on their specific circumstances. 64
Second, in Echazabal, the employee is certain to suffer substantial ad-
verse health effects as a result of his employment in the coker unit,
whereas the women in Johnson Controls may or may not have experi-
enced the negative effects of the lead exposure depending on their de-
cision to become pregnant. 16
5
D. Liability and Moral Burden
Finally, the Echazabal court gave little consideration to the ad-
verse implications that would be felt by the employer if the "direct
threat to self' defense is not recognized. Specifically, the court ig-
159. SeeS. REP. No. 101-116, at 27.
160. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r).
161. Id.
162. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 27.
163. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
164. Int'l Union, United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1991).
165. Id. at 197.
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nored the potential for a substantial increase in tort liability, and more
importantly, the moral burden to the employer. While an employer
could limit its potential liability by requiring the employee to sign a
waiver, this may not prevent suits brought by the deceased or injured
employee's family and dependents. Furthermore, the moral implica-
tions to employers and managers are significant. Employers will carry
the heavy burden of having hired an employee whose injury or death
is likely because the employee was unable or unwilling to make his or
her own decision to stay out of harm's way. Both of these collateral
effects are too burdensome to support a limitation of the direct threat
defense.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision not to accept the "direct threat to
self' defense is wrong. Concern over paternalism, while certainly le-
gitimate, clouded the court's reasoning and resulted in an unnecessary
limitation on employer defenses under the ADA. Paternalism is a se-
rious problem in the workplace, but even more serious is a person's
health and safety. Employers make decisions everyday about what is
best for their employees. When those decisions are improperly pater-
nalistic in nature, there is no place for them in the workplace and they
should be outlawed. However, an employer's concern about an em-
ployee's significant risk of substantial harm is a concern that should
not be discouraged.
The distinction between an employer's proper and improper mo-
tivation is a fine line. The EEOC is in a better position than the
courts to understand the realities of the modern workplace, and the
courts should give deference to the agency's interpretation of the de-
fense. As applied, the "direct threat to self' defense is sufficiently
narrow to alleviate any improper use of the defense. Moreover, to
conclude that "direct threat to self' is not a proper expansion of the
defense is fundamentally at odds with other mandatory workplace
health and safety laws. Finally, it is not logical that Congress could
have intended such profoundly counterintuitive results, creating a dis-
proportionate moral and litigation burden on employers.
20011
